Ohio Sexual Offender Registration Law Library: Reported opinions

A listing reported opinion that cites Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2950. Keep in mind to fully research an issue. Specifically if you find an opinion that favors or rejects an argument your making. That opinion may have been reversed or affirmed by an higher court or another opinion. Also there are many supporting opinions that are cited that you should familiarize yourself with. With that said do not count on this in any way as your sole source. It is intended to be a very good starting point and tool to understand the history of how we have gotten to the point we are at within the courts. Another but incomplete resource for Ohio opinions after 2000 can be found on the Ohio Supreme Court page.

Cite	Name	Date	Issue / Summary / As cited	Court	ORC, Const Amd.


126 Ohio St.3d 321, 2010-Ohio-3212, pdf	Chojnacki v. Cordray	7/13/2010	Causes dismissed as moot.	12 App, Warren
126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, pdf	State v. Bodyke	6/3/2010	Criminal law — R.C. Chapter 2950 — Sex offenders — R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 violate separation of powers by requiring executive branch to reclassify sex offenders already classified by court order — Only appellate courts are constitutionally permitted to review or modify court judgments — Executive branch may not reopen final judgments — Stare decisis — Doctrine not controlling in cases presenting constitutional question — R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 severed. From 2008-Ohio-6387	Ohio St - Huron
2010-Ohio-2123, 125 Ohio St.3d 450, pdf	State v. Clayborn	5/20/2010	Criminal appeals — App.R. 4(A) — An appeal from an R.C. Chapter 2950 sexual-offender classification is an appeal in a criminal case that must be filed pursuant to App.R. 4(A) within 30 days after judgment is entered — Judgment affirmed.	Ohio St - 10th App, Franklin
2010-Ohio-958, 124 Ohio St.3d 556, pdf html	State v. McConville	3/18/2010	Criminal law — Sexual-offender registration — R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) — Suspension of community-notification requirements — Effective date. From 182 Ohio App.3d 99, 2009-Ohio-1713.	Ohio St - 00 App, Lorain	R.C. 2950.11(F)(2)


188 Ohio App.3d 498, 2010-Ohio-3507, pdf	Keeney v. State	7/30/2010	SEX OFFENSES: Where the record does not reflect that the petitioner has been convicted of a sexually oriented offense, viz., there has never been a judicial determination that his offense of felonious assault was committed with the purpose of gratifying his sexual needs or desires, he is not required to register as a sex offender under R.C. Chapter 2950.	Hamilton
188 Ohio App.3d 232, 2010-Ohio-3247, pdf	State v. Powell	7/9/2010	A manifest injustice is shown and the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s petition to vacate his guilty plea. Appellant’s plea is vacated and the matter is remanded.	Greene
188 Ohio App.3d 318, 2010-Ohio-2295. pdf	In re G.M.	5/24/2010	Juvenile court was without jurisdiction to issue an order classifying a delinquent child as a juvenile sex offender after he turned 21.	3rd App, Defiance

Cite	Name	Date	Issue / Summary / As cited	Court	ORC, Const Amd.


185 Ohio App.3d 130, 2009-Ohio-5346, pdf html	Burbrink v. State	10/9/2009	SEX OFFENSES - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIM.: The retroactive application of Senate Bill 10’s tier-classification and registration requirements to a sex offender who had pleaded guilty to sexual battery pursuant to a plea bargain under former R.C. Chapter 2950 does not violate the Contract Clause of the Ohio and United States Constitutions, because at the time he entered his guilty plea the offender had no reasonable expectation that his sex offense would never be made the subject of future legislation and no vested right concerning his registration duties. [But, see, DISSENT: The plea agreement between the defendant and the state was a valid contract, the terms of which provided that the defendant was to be classified under former R.C. Chapter 2950 as a sexually-oriented offender with a ten-year registration requirement; applying Senate Bill 10 to change the defendant’s classification and registration requirements violates the constitutional prohibition against laws that impair the obligations of contracts.] Senate Bill 10’s tier-classification and registration requirements are remedial, collateral consequences of the underlying criminal sex offense, and they do not affect any plea agreement previously entered between the state and the defendant. Under former R.C. Chapter 2950, the defendant was a sexually-oriented offender by operation of law: The state fulfilled its part of the plea agreement by not requesting a higher sexual-offender classification; and once the defendant had pleaded guilty and the trial court had sentenced him, both the defendant and the state had performed their respective parts of the plea agreement, and no action taken after that time could have breached the plea agreement.	1st App, Hamilton
184 Ohio App.3d 754, 2009-Ohio-3617, pdf html	Miller v. Cordray	7/23/2009	Appellant's Illinois conviction was substantially equivalent to the Ohio offense of gross sexual imposition against a child under the age of 13 such that it constituted a sexually oriented offense for purposes of R.C. Chapter 2950. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was affirmed.	Franklin
184 Ohio App.3d 611, 2009-Ohio-5334, pdf html	State v. Blanton	10/6/2009	An appellant who stipulates that he was required to provide notice of a change of address waives an assignment of error that the Ohio General Assembly created a six-month hiatus in the registration requirements in enacting S.B. No. 10. Such a hiatus argument lacks substantive merit because the repealing clause becomes effective on the effective date of the reinstating clause. R.C. 2950.05 is a strict liability statute, so no mental element is necessary to prove that a crime was committed. A trial court errs by admitting hearsay testimony about the substance of conversations and information contained in motel receipts when such testimony is merely introduced to bolster the conclusions reached by the investigators. There is a reasonable possibility that the admission of hearsay contributed to appellant's conviction. However, based upon the admitted evidence, we cannot find that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a discharge. Rather, retrial is necessary, in which appellant will have the opportunity to raise any affirmative defense he feels applicable.	Franklin
184 Ohio App.3d 241, 2009-Ohio-4582, pdf pdf html	State v. Daily	9/4/2009	Trial court violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by ordering his retained counsel removed and appointing other counsel to represent him, without notice to Defendant or an opportunity to be heard concerning whether he wished to retain other counsel of his choosing. Reversed and remanded. (Froelich, J., concurring).	Montgomery
183 Ohio App.3d 651, 2009-Ohio-4306, pdf html	Art v. Erwin	8/25/2009	Concealment actions under R.C. 2109.50 are not referable to arbitration.	Franklin
182 Ohio App.3d 331, 2009-Ohio-1881, pdf html	Toney v. State	4/23/2009	ADAM WALSH ACT (AWA); MEGAN’S LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE ADAM WALSH ACT.	Cuyahoga
182 Ohio App.3d 168, 2009-Ohio-1694, pdf html	In re P.M.	4/9/2009	Juvenile sex offender registrant; community notification; Tier II classification	Cuyahoga
182 Ohio App.3d 99, 2009-Ohio-1713, pdf html	State v. McConville	4/13/2009	Adam Walsh Act – sex offender – community notification – R.C. 2950.11 – statutory interpretation	Lorain
181 Ohio App.3d 280, 2009-Ohio-872, pdf html	Sewell v. State	2/27/2009	SEX OFFENSES – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CIVIL: Where the petitioner had been classified as a sexually oriented offender under former R.C. Chapter 2950 and had been reclassified by the Attorney General as a Tier III sex offender under Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (“Senate Bill 10”), the trial court did not err in overruling the petitioner’s constitutional challenges to Senate Bill 10 because the retroactive application of Senate Bill 10’s tier-classification and registration requirements does not violate the prohibition on retroactive laws contained in Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio Constitution’s Due Process Clause, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Ohio Constitution, or the separation-of-powers doctrine. The retroactive application of Senate Bill 10’s tier-classification and registration requirements does not violate the constitutional ban on retroactive laws because a sex offender has no reasonable “settled expectation” or vested right concerning the registration requirements imposed on him; R.C. Chapter 2950 is a remedial civil statute, and Senate Bill 10 establishes a remedial regulatory scheme for the purpose of protecting the public. Senate Bill 10 does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the registration and notification provisions are remedial and not punitive, and because they do not have the effect of converting a remedial statute into a punitive one. Senate Bill 10 does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine because it does not require the Attorney General to reopen final court judgments: It simply changes the classification and registration requirements for sex offenders and requires that the new procedures be applied to sex offenders currently registered under the old law; and because sex offenders have no reasonable expectation that their sex offenses will never be made the subject of future sex-offender legislation, Senate Bill 10 cannot be said to abrogate a final judicial determination. Senate Bill 10 does not violate the Due Process Clause because it does not deprive sex offenders of a protected liberty or property interest.	Hamilton
181 Ohio App.3d 53, 2009-Ohio-467, pdf html	State v. Townsend	2/5/2009	R.C. 2950.04; Jurisdiction; Sexual Predator.	Cuyahoga

Cite	Name	Date	Issue / Summary / As cited	Court	ORC, Const Amd.


2008-Ohio-4824, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, pdf html	State v. Ferguson	10/1/2008	Criminal law — Sexual predator specification — Senate Bill 5 amendments to R.C. Chapter 2950 do not violate the ex post facto and retroactivity provisions of the United States and Ohio Constitutions — Judgment affirmed.
2008-Ohio-542, 117 Ohio St.3d 165, pdf html	Hyle v. Porter	2/20/2008	Criminal law — Retroactivity of criminal legislation — R.C. 2950.031 — Statute prohibiting sex offenders from residing within 1,000 feet of a school may not be applied retroactively to an offender who owned his home and committed his offense before the statute’s effective date.


179 Ohio App.3d 107, 2008-Ohio-5763, pdf html	State v. Graves	11/4/2008	Criminal Law: Any errors in classifying appellant as a sexual predator under the old classification scheme was rendered moot by the new scheme enacted as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Am.Sub.S.B. 10.	Ross
177 Ohio App.3d 78, 2008-Ohio-2980, pdf html	State v. Clay	6/20/2008	SEX OFFENSES: Defendant’s challenge on appeal to his classification under former R.C. Chapter 2950 as a sexual predator was not rendered moot by the law’s amendment: defendant insisted on appeal that he should have been classified under former R.C. Chapter 2950 not as a sexual predator, but as a sexually oriented offender; and while his classification under the former law as a sexual predator effectively subjected him to the amended law’s community–notification provisions, his classification under the former law as a sexually oriented offender would have exempted him from the amended law’s community-notification provisions. The trial court erred in classifying defendant as a “sexual predator” in October 2007 based upon Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10’s amendments to R.C. 2950.09, when the amendments were not effective until January 1, 2008. The trial court’s classification of defendant as a sexual predator was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, when defendant’s offense was his first sexually oriented offense, and the trial court did not articulate sufficient findings on the record to demonstrate defendant’s likelihood of recidivism.	Hamilton


145 Ohio Misc.2d 98, 2008-Ohio-593, pdf html	Slagle v. State	2/1/2008	Adam Walsh Act -- (1) the petitioner was not entitled to relief pursuant to R.C. 2950.031(E); (2) the new classification and registration requirements do not violate the separation of powers principle inherent in the Ohio Constitution; (3) the new classification and registration requirements are not impermissibly retroactive and do not violation Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution; (4) the new classification and registration laws are remedial in nature pursuant to the analysis in State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570, and do not violate the Ex Post Facto clause of the U.S. Constitution; (5) the new classification and registration requirements do not violate the Double Jeopardy clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions; and, (6) the petitioner failed to demonstrate any breach of a plea agreement contract between himself and the State.

Cite	Name	Date	Issue / Summary / As cited	Court	ORC, Const Amd.


2006-Ohio-856, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, pdf	State v. Foster,	12/27/2006	Criminal law — Felonies — Sentencing — Sentencing statutes are unconstitutional to extent that judicial fact-finding is required before imposition of sentence greater than maximum authorized by jury verdict or by defendant’s admissions, before imposition of consecutive sentences, or before imposition of penalty enhancements for major drug offenders and repeat violent offenders — Offending statutes severed.	Ohio St.


170 Ohio App.3d 710, 2006-Ohio-5454	Hyle v. Porter	10/20/2006	Constitutional Law/Civil: The trial court did not err in ruling that R.C. 2950.031 (Ohio’s residency-restriction statute prohibiting registered sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of a school) is constitutional as retroactively applied to an offender who had committed his offense prior to July 31, 2003 (the statute’s effective date). (1) R.C. 2950.031 does not impinge upon the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws; (2) a due-process claim challenging the statute on speculative facts is not ripe for review; and (3) although the Ohio legislature intended the 1,000-foot rule to be applied retroactively, it is a remedial measure that does not violate the Ohio Constitution’s prohibition against retroactive laws.	1st App, Hamilton
169 Ohio App.3d 356, 2006-Ohio-5597	Logue v. Leis	10/27/2006	Sex Offenses - Constitutional Law/Civil: Under R.C. 2950.09(A), an out-of-state sexual offender who is convicted of a non-exempt offense and who is required to register for life as a sex offender in the state where he is convicted is automatically classified as a sexual predator in Ohio, but such an offender may move for reclassification under R.C. 2950.09(F)(2). Due process is not violated when an out-of-state offender, already required to register for life in another state and automatically classified as a sexual predator in Ohio, is required to bear the burden of persuasion on the issue of recidivism when he or she petitions for reclassification under R.C. 2950.09(F)(2). Placing the burden of persuasion on the offender with respect to recidivism does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: There is a rational basis for such an allocation of the burden, when it is reasonable to assume that an out-of-state offender already required to register for life as a sex offender poses a danger to the public, and when Ohio has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens from likely recidivists.	1st App, Hamilton
166 Ohio App.3d 444, 2006-Ohio-1409	State v. Williams	3/27/2006	A registered sex offender who has registered as homeless and provided no mailing address under former R.C. 2950.05 may be prosecuted for failing to verify a current address under R.C. 2950.06 even if the sheriff did not send a written warning.	3rd App, Allen


139 Ohio Misc.2d 76, 2006-Ohio-4743	State ex rel. White v. Billings	8/10/2006	R.C. 2950.031 is not unconstitutional; Because R.C. 2950.031 deals entirely with remedies that may be had against sex offenders who live within 1,000 feet of a school, complete relief may be afforded in an action against the sex offender; thus, the state may not join as a necessary party to a R.C. 2950.031(A) case a person who allowed the sex offender to live in their home, which is near a school.	COMMON PLEAS, CLERMONT COUNTY,

Cite	Name	Date	Issue / Summary / As cited	Court	ORC, Const Amd.


106 Ohio St.3d 120, 2005-Ohio-4098, 832 N.E.2d 718 pdf html	State v. Champion	8/24/2005	Criminal law – Sexually oriented offenses – R.C. 2950.06 – Registration requirement – Defendant whose prison term was completed before July 1, 1997, not required to register, when.	Ohio St


162 Ohio App.3d 375, 2005-Ohio-3813, 833 N.E.2d 774 pdf	State v. Small	07/28/2005	Upon defendant-appellee's application, the judgment in State v. Small, Franklin App. No. 04AP-316, 2005-Ohio-2291, is modified. Upon reconsideration, defendant-appellee's classification as a "sexually oriented offender" cannot withstand rational-basis scrutiny on an "as applied" substantive due process basis.	10th App. Franklin
162 Ohio App.3d 325, 2005-Ohio-2291, pdf	State v. Small	05/10/2005	Because R.C. Chapter 2950 does not infringe upon a fundamental constitutional right, the trial court's judgment that an indictment against defendant for alleged violations of R.C. 2950.05 and 2950.06 violated substantive due process under state and federal constitutions as applied to defendant was error.	10th App, Franklin
161 Ohio App.3d 192, 2005-Ohio-2364 pdf	In re Goodman	5/13/2005	JUVENILE LAW – juvenile sex offender; R.C. 2152.83; R.C. 2950.01; registration requirement; constitutional; public policy; rational basis; ineffective assistance of counsel.	11th App, Ashtabula
161 Ohio App.3d 127, 2005-Ohio-2461, 829 N.E.2d 738 pdf	State v. Kennedy	5/19/2005	SEXUAL PREDATOR; EX POST FACTO. R.C. 2950.09; INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE; PRIOR CONVICTIONS; HABITUAL SEXUAL OFFENDER.	8th App, Cuyahoga

Cite	Name	Date	Issue / Summary / As cited	Court	ORC, Const Amd.


104 Ohio St.3d 106, 2004-Ohio-6238, 808 N.E.2d 283 pdf html	State v. Smith	12/8/2004	Criminal law — Sexually violent predator specification — Conviction of a sexually violent offense cannot support the specification that the offender is a sexually violent predator as defined in R.C. 2971.01(H)(1) if the conduct leading to the conviction and the sexually violent predator specification are charged in the same indictment.	Ohio St.
103 Ohio St.3d 144, 2004-Ohio-4777, 814 N.E.2d 846, pdf	State v. Cowan	09/22/2004	Dogs – R.C. 955.22 – Failure to confine or restrain vicious or dangerous dog -- Procedural due process – Statute unconstitutional insofar as it fails to provide dog owner with opportunity to be heard on question whether dog is “vicious” or “dangerous”—Convictions reversed.
102 Ohio St.3d 467, 2004-Ohio-3976, 812 N.E.2d 970 pdf	State v. LaMar	08/11/2004	App.R. 26(B) — Application for reopening appeal denied, when.	Ohio St.
100 Ohio St.3d 418. 2004-Ohio-1498, 805 N.E.2d 1128 pdf	Johnson v. Marshall	04/14/2004	Prohibition — Writ sought prohibiting judge of common pleas court from proceeding with a sexual predator classification hearing — Court of appeals’ dismissal of complaint affirmed.


157 Ohio App. 3d 427, 2004-Ohio-2992, 811 N.E.2d 601 pdf htnl	State v. Pasqua	6/11/2004	The trial court’s decision to limit its inquiry to a comparison of Ohio’s reporting requirements with the reporting requirements of another state, when determining whether an out-of-state offender automatically labeled as a sexual predator under R.C. 2950.09(A) was entitled to have that classification removed, ignored the plain language of R.C. 2950.09(F)(2) and violated due process: the defendant should have been given the opportunity to present evidence that he was not likely to engage in sexually-oriented offenses in the future and was thus not a sexual predator under Ohio law. When an out-of-state offender who is automatically classified as a sexual predator under R.C. 2950.09(A) challenges his classification pursuant to R.C. 2950.09(F), the trial court must first determine whether the sexually-oriented offense in the other state is substantially equivalent to one of the offenses in R.C. 2905.01(D)(1)(a), (b), (c), or d; if the offense is similar to that degree, then the offender is entitled to a hearing where he has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that he is not likely to commit a sexually-oriented offense in the future.	Hamilton
156 Ohio App.3d 241, 2004-Ohio-747, 805 N.E.2d 173 pdf html	State v. Baron	2/19/2004	SEXUAL PREDATOR; R.C. 2950.09; MEDIA; RECUSAL; CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 3(E)(1); APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY; EX POST FACTO; RETROACTIVE; CLEAR AND CONVINCING; RES JUDICATA.	8th App, Cuyahoga

Cite	Name	Date	Issue / Summary / As cited	Court	ORC, Const Amd.


2003-Ohio-5452, 100 Ohio St.3d 172, pdf html	State v. Taylor	10/29/2003	Criminal procedure — Classification as a sexual predator — Defendants not required to register as sexual predators under R.C. 2950.04, when — R.C. 2950.04, construed and applied.	100 Ohio St.3d 172
99 Ohio St.3d 299, 2003-Ohio-3652, 791 N.E.2d 456 pdf html	State ex rel. Dussell v. Lakewood Police Dept.	7/23/2003	Criminal law — Mandamus sought to compel Lakewood Police Department to remove from its records any reference to relator as a sex offender prior to his arrest for rape in October 1990 — Court of appeals’ denial of writ affirmed.


155 Ohio App.3d 453, 2003-Ohio-6399 pdf	State v. Snyder	12/1/2003	Challenge of constitutionality of R.C. 2907.07(E)(2) on grounds of vagueness, overbreadth, violation of First Amendment rights, violation of commerce clause and violation of substantive due process rights because it allows entrapment; challenge of constitutionality of R.C. 2907.07(E)(2) as applied by R.C. 2950.01(D).	Allen
154 Ohio App.3d 385, 2003-Ohio-4908	State V Gopp	07/17/2003	rape, sexual predator, habitual offender, R.C. 2950.09(E), R.C. 2950.09(B), maximum sentence, R.C. 2929.14(C), R.C. 2929.19(B), consecutive sentence, R.C. 2929.14(E)(4), R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c), findings, reasons, allied offenses, separate act, R.C. 2941.25.	9th App, Wayne
154 Ohio App.3d 170, 2003-Ohio-4000, 796 N.E.2d 942 pdf	State v. Gann	07/28/2003	Vagueness doctrine; overbreadth doctrine; R.C. 2907.323(A); compelling prostitution; R.C. 2907.21(A)(2); R.C. 2907.21(A)(3).	Butler
154 Ohio App.3d 59, 2003-Ohio-4524, 796 N.E.2d 50	State v Goff	08/27/2003	Considering all of the information available to the trial court in this matter, we find that the evidence was sufficient to lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that Goff is a sexual predator.
154 Ohio App.3d 9, 2003-Ohio-4421, 796 N.E.2d 12 pdf html	State v. Gonzalez	8/22/2003	The trial court did not err when it classified the defendant as a sexually oriented offender by operation of law without a hearing. A felonious assault committed with a purpose to gratify the offender’s sexual needs or desires is a sexually-oriented offense, and the sexually oriented offender designation attaches to an offender as a matter of law. The trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant to two consecutive maximum terms, where the court made the appropriate findings and gave supporting reasons; The record supported the imposition of two maximum sentences based on the finding that the defendant committed the worst form of the offense, and the record supported that the defendant serve consecutive sentences, based on findings that the consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public, were not disproportionate, and that the physical harm caused was so great and unusual.	1st App, Hamilton
153 Ohio App.3d 654, 2003-Ohio-4239, 750 N.E.2d 160 pdf html	State v. McKinniss	8/11/2003	Sexual predator defined: R.C. 2950.01(E)-sexual battery is a "sexually oriented offense": R.C. 2950.01(D)(1)(a)-R.C. 2950.09(B)(2) lists various factors to consider in determining whether someone is likely to sexually re-offend-must determine sexual offender classification on a case-by-case basis-R.C. 2950.09(B)(4) requires that the trial court not determine someone to be a sexual predator unless the evidence is clear and convincing to the contrary-trial court is afforded discretion in determining the classification of a sexual offender-circumstances underlying the current offense are highly indicative of whether the offender is likely to re-offend sexually, especially crimes involving the exploitation of children; psychological evaluations must be viewed in light of all the evidence-when one convicted of sexual battery of a child, which involved multiple occasions with the child, who admits to having violent sexual fantasies, having nearly killed 3 females in the past, is diagnosed with anti-social personality disorder and psychopathy with elements of sexual deviancy, and has alcohol/drug dependency, the trial court does not err in classifying him as a sexual predator although one psychologist does not opine that he is likely to sexually re-offend based upon test results but another clinically determines that he is likely to sexually re-offend.	3rd App, Crawford
153 Ohio App.3d 635, 2003-Ohio-4200, 795 N.E.2d 145 pdf html	State v. Morales	08/08/2003	In a sexual predator adjudication hearing, the trial court is not bound by the results on the Static-99 test, which show that the defendant is at a comparatively low risk to re-offend; rather, the trial court is required to consider all the evidence and circumstances of the particular case under the statutory guidelines
153 Ohio App.3d 144, 2003-Ohio-3345, 791 N.E.2d 1053 pdf html	State v. Purser	6/26/2003	Sexual predator, classification, determination, hearing; R.C. Chapter 2950; sexually oriented offense; factors; clear and convincing evidence; Krueger; statistical evidence; judicial discretion; recidivism, likelihood of; psychological reports; pedophile; doctrine of res judicata; affirmative defense; jurisdiction; “inmate sentencing attachment finding defendant to be a sexual predator”.	8th App, Cuyahoga
152 Ohio App.3d 294, 2003-Ohio-1546, 787 N.E.2d 678 pdf html	State v. Crooks	3/28/2003	Constitutional Law/Criminal - Sexual Offender; The retroactive application of R.C. 2911.11(A)(3), as amended, to enlarge the time for prosecuting the defendant for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and rape, did not violate Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, because the General Assembly clearly intended that the amended statute be applied retroactively to the offenses for which the defendant was prosecuted, and because the amended statute was not substantive, but remedial. Amended R.C. 2901.13(A)(3) is a remedial measure, because the statute advances the purposes of a statute of limitations—to prevent stale claims and to preserve relevant evidence—and because the statute does not redefine a felony or increase the penalty therefor, but merely enlarges the time for prosecuting a felony to accommodate new technology recognized by the General Assembly as scientifically reliable and relevant. In determining that the defendant was a sexual predator, the trial court’s tongue-lashing of the defendant did not rise to the level of the considered analysis contemplated in State v. Eppinger, 91 Ohio St.3d 158, 2001-Ohio-247, 743 N.E.2d 881; although the circumstances of the defendant’s offenses might have justified the court’s feelings of outrage, its rhetorical excesses were inconsistent with the remedial (rather than punitive) purposes of R.C. Chapter 2950. The trial court, despite its departure from the Eppinger model, did not err in finding the defendant to be a sexual predator, when the record provided ample evidence to support the court’s determination that the defendant was likely to re-offend.	Hamilton
151 Ohio App.3d 518, 2003-Ohio-430, 784 N.E.2d 768 pdf html	State v. Youlten	01/30/2003	Evidence did not support finding inmate a sexual predator. Though he may have fantasized to some degree about illegal sexual activity, and had a past that was somewhat unsavory, he had benefited from prison programs and tested low as to the likelihood of reoffending.	8th App, Cuyahoga

Cite	Name	Date	Issue / Summary / As cited	Court	ORC, Const Amd.


96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d 805 pdf html	State v. Hayden	8/28/2002	Criminal law — Sex offenders — Confrontation Clauses of Sixth Amendment to United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution do not apply to R.C. Chapter 2950 — Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution do not require that trial court conduct a hearing to determine whether a defendant is a sexually oriented offender — Sexually oriented offender designation attaches as a matter of law, when.	Ohio St
96 Ohio St.3d 178, 2002-Ohio-4009, 772 N.E.2d 1172 pdf	State v. LaSalle	08/21/2002	Statutory construction — Absent a clear pronouncement by the General Assembly that a statute is to be applied retrospectively, a statute may be applied prospectively only — R.C. 1.48, applied — Criminal law — Statutory law in effect at the time of the filing of an R.C. 2953.32 application to seal a record of conviction is controlling.


151 Ohio App. 3d 243, 2002-Ohio-7345, 783 N.E.2d 965 pdf	State v. Chambers	12/31/2002	83-year old inmate with Alzheimer's was found incompetent to understand the nature of a sex offender classification hearing. Though it was error to proceed with the hearing, since he was not found to be a sexual predator, classification as a sexually oriented offender was automatic.
151 Ohio App.3d 36, 2002-Ohio-5207, 783 N.E.2d 539 pdf html	State v. Brown	9/26/2002	Sexual predator classification; jurisdiction; R.C. 2950.09; evidence; admissible; authentication; letter; post-sentence investigation report; clear and convincing; abuse of discretion; confronting witnesses. Failure by the Department of Corrections to state the reasons for its recommendation that a classification hearing be conducted is not a jurisdictional defect.	7th App, Mahoning
149 Ohio App.3d 453, 2002-Ohio-5192, 777 N.E.2d 905 pdf html	State v. Wesley	9/30/2002	R.C. 2950.09 sexual predator hearing is a civil proceeding. Application to vacate an R.C. 2950 finding is pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), not an application for postconviction relief.	Lucas
149 Ohio App.3d 422, 2002-Ohio-4812, 777 N.E.2d 882 pdf	State v. Cook	9/13/2002	The trial court did not err in overruling the defendant’s motion to suppress, since the police had probable cause to search the premises where evidence of criminal activity was found. Additionally, the trial court did not err in admitting materials generated from a “mirror image” made of the hard drive of the defendant’s computer. The mirror image was properly authenticated, and any conflicts in testimony related to the weight to be given the evidence, not its admissibility. Finally, the trial court did not err in finding that the defendant was a sexual predator, as the record contained clear and convincing evidence of that fact. Judgment affirmed.	2nd App, Montgomery
147 Ohio App.3d 505, 2002-Ohio-808, 771 N.E.2d 297 pdf html	State v. Philpott	03/11/2002	Criminal law -- Sexual predator determination hearings are "special proceedings" -- When trial court declines to make a determination under R.C. 2950.09, no substantial rights are affected -- No final appealable order exists, when -- Failure of state to appeal is of no consequence, when -- Res judicata does not bar sexual predator determination, when.	8th App, Cuyahoga
147 Ohio App.3d 94, 2002-Ohio-494, 768 N.E.2d 1207 pdf html	State v. Robertson	2/7/2002	Criminal law -- Sexual predator classification -- Accomplice to rape of child -- Sexually oriented offense charges may be considered by trial court -- Courts are not bound by psychiatric findings and "likely to reoffend sexually" is not couched solely in terms of recidivism test results. Defendant pled guilty to raping the 22-year old driver of a broken down car, and was adjudicated a sexual predator. No error in trial court considering co-defendant's rape of the 12-year old passenger as a part of the overall circumstances of the crime. Defendant had been indicted for complicity in that attack, but charges were dismissed as a part of his plea bargain.	3rd App, Hancock

Cite	Name	Date	Issue / Summary / As cited	Court	ORC, Const Amd.


93 Ohio St.3d 419, 2001-Ohio-1581, 755 N.E.2d 857 pdf	State v. Burnett	10/17/2001	Constitutional law — Municipal corporations — Cincinnati ordinance establishes drug-exclusion zones within city — Chapter 755 of the Cincinnati Municipal Code is an unconstitutional violation of the right to travel as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and a violation of Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution — Supreme Court of Ohio not bound by rulings on federal statutory or constitutional law made by a federal court other than the United States Supreme Court.	Ohio St. - 1st App, Hamilton
93 Ohio St. 3d 391, 397, 2001-Ohio-1341, 754 N.E.2d 1252 pdf	State v. Jones	10/03/2001	R.C. 2950.09 prohibits a trial court from classifying a defendant as a sexual predator once that defendant has been acquitted of a sexually violent predator specification.
93 Ohio St.3d 173, 754 N.E.2d 219	State v Woziak
92 Ohio St.3d 584, 2001-Ohio-1288, 752 N.E.2d 276 pdf	State v. Thompson	08/22/2001	Criminal law — Sexual predators — Judge must consider guidelines set out in R.C. 2950.09(B)(2) but has discretion to determine what weight, if any, will be assigned to each guideline — Pursuant to R.C. 2950.09(B)(2), a judge may also consider any other evidence deemed relevant to determine likelihood of recidivism — R.C. 2950.09(B)(2) does not violate separation-of-powers doctrine.
91 Ohio St.3d 158, 2001-Ohio-247, 743 N.E.2d 881 pdf html	State v. Eppinger	3/28/2001	"An expert witness shall be provided to an indigent defendant at an 2950.09(B)(1) sexual offender classification hearing if the court determines within its sound discretion that such services are reasonably necessary to determine whether the offender is likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually oriented offenses within the meaning of R.C. 2950.01(E)." Case involved an inmate returned pursuant to 2950.09(C). Opinion suggest appointment of an expert is particularly desirable for those convicted of a single offense. At p. 166 the court describes a model sex offender classification hearing	Ohio St


147 Ohio App.3d 568, 2001-Ohio-8823, 771 N.E.2d 867 pdf html	State v. Dobies	11/16/2001	Criminal law -- Sexual predator determination -- R.C. Chapter 2950 -- Trial court abused its discretion in not granting motion for psychiatric evaluation -- Updated psychiatric evaluation reasonably necessary to determine likelihood of recidivism, when.	11th App, Lake
145 Ohio App.3d 92, 761 N.E.2d 1125 html	State V Winchester	08/06/2001	Predator finding was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. (1) Facts of the original prosecution were unsavory but not indicative of future offending. (2) Prison discipline record was not indicative of future sex offenses. (3) Two week old Abel Assessment indicated no interest in sadistic sexual behavior and that the subject did not have any persistent sexual interests that might be problematic.	8th App, Cuyahoga
144 Ohio App.3d 339, 760 N.E.2d 51 html	State v Vintson	06/18/2001
144 Ohio App.3d 322, 760 N.E.2d 40 html	State v Grider	06/18/2001	Sexually oriented offender status attaches by operation of law. There is no right to a classification hearing, nor must the indictment carry notice such status will result upon conviction.
144 Ohio App.3d 168, 579 N.E.2d 847 html	State v Abelt	06/11/2001	(1) Court rejects claim that practice conducting sex offender classification hearings far in advance of possible parole is a systemic flaw violating due process. (2) Psychological evaluation was called for where offense was committed long ago and the defendant has participated in counselling programs while imprisoned. (3) Dissenting judge argues that since the majority held the evidence insufficient to support the finding, the proper remedy is judgment for the defendant, not remand for a further hearing.	8th App, Cuyahoga
144 Ohio App.3d 116, 759 N.E.2d 809 html	State v Hunter	06/01/2001	The only R.C. 2950.09(B)(2) factor which weighed against the defendant was the age of the victim. On a review of the record as a whole, and applying the civil standard for appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence, the state did not present competent, credible evidence that the defendant would commit sexually oriented offenses in the future.	1st App, Hamilton
143 Ohio App.3d 232, 2001-Ohio-3530, 757 N.E.2d 1176 pdf html	State v. High	1/24/2001	Since the Rules of Evidence do not strictly apply in sexual predator determination hearings, a court may consider a prior conviction more than 10 years old, as would be excludable under Evid. R. 609(B).	Mahoning
143 Ohio App.3d 86, 757 N.E.2d 413	State v. Grimes	04/23/2001
142 Ohio App. 3d 580, 756 N.E.2d 676 html	State v. Riley	04/06/2001	There is a gap in the coverage of R.C. 2950.04 concerning the duty of adjudicated sexual predators to register. Defendant had completed serving his time on a prior GSI conviction in 1985. Because he was in prison following the 1997 effective date of R.C. 2950.09, he could be adjudicated a sexual predator. But because he was not in prison on a sexually oriented offense, R.C. 2950.04 did not place him under an obligation to register.
142 Ohio App.3d 443, 756 N.E.2d 127	Peoples Rights Organization, Inc. v. Montgomery,	04/09/2001		12th App, Butler
142 Ohio App.3d 389, 755 N.E.2d 958	State v Childs	04/30/2001	In 1985 inmate was acquitted of rape but convicted of felonious assault. Court could consider victim's testimony in determining that the felonious assault was sexually motivated and thus a sexually oriented offense. Even if it were not, defendant had previously been convicted of a sexually oriented offense and was subject to being adjudicated a sexual predator though he was no longer serving a term of imprisonment on that charge.
142 Ohio App.3d 291, 755 N.E.2d 440	State v. Allen	04/20/2001
142 Ohio App.3d 179, 2001-Ohio-3158, 754 N.E.2d 1273 pdf	State v. Kelly	04/25/2001	Report prepared by a psychology assistant at a prison deemed admissible as "reliable hearsay."
142 Ohio App. 3d 129, 754 N.E.2d 285	State v. Melton	04/02/2001	Since habitual sex offender status rests on the existence of qualifying convictions, recitation of the victim's police statement, even if erroneous, had no bearing on the court's determination. Court had declined to classify the defendant as a sexual predator.
142 Ohio App.3d 88, 753 N.E.2d 984	State v. Swann	03/30/2001
141 Ohio App.3d 160, 750 N.E.2d 615 html	State v Randall	01/22/2001	Finding the defendant a sexual predator was at odds with the psychological evaluation, but the trial court offered no explanation of its contrary finding. Since this precludes meaningful review of a manifest weight challenge, case is reversed and remanded for the trial court to provide an explanation.	11th App, Lake
141 Ohio App.3d 6, 749 N.E.2d 796	State v Prether		Prior to January 1, 2002, a juvenile delinquency adjudication did not qualify as a prior conviction in determining habitual sex offender status for an adult. But according to amended R.C. 2950.01(B) such adjudications count, and juveniles may be classified as habitual sex offenders.
141 Ohio App.3d 1, 2000-Ohio-2044, 749 N.E.2d 792 pdf	State v. Hardie	1/4/2001	The sexual predator statutes apply to women. The evidence was sufficient to support classification as a sexual predator, though the conduct leading to conviction was consensual and did not involve force.
140 Ohio App.3d 741, 758 N.E.2d 1158	State v McPherson	06/04/2001	Soliciting for prostitution after a positive HIV test, though a felony, is not a sexually oriented offense.

Cite	Name	Date	Issue / Summary / As cited	Court	ORC, Const Amd.


90 Ohio St.3d 299, 2000-Ohio-62, 737 N.E.2d 958 pdf html	State ex rel. Mason v. Griffin	11/22/2000	Criminal procedure - Classification as sexual predator - Trial judge has duty to determine whether defendant is a sexual predator - R.C. 2950.09(C)(2)(a), construed and applied.
89 Ohio St.3d 59, 2000-Ohio-438	In re Sex Offender Registration Cases	5/15/2000	Criminal procedure - Sex offender registration - Disposition of causes on authority of State v. Williams.
88 Ohio St.3d 513,2000-Ohio-428, 728 N.E.2d 342 pdf html	State v. Williams	4/28/2000	Criminal procedure - Sex offender registration - R.C. Chapter 2950 does not violate constitutional rights guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy, Bill of Attainder, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions * * *.
88 Ohio St.3d 387, 2000-Ohio-355, 727 N.E.2d 579 pdf html	State v. Gowdy	4/28/2000	Criminal procedure - Notice requirement for sexual offender classification hearings under R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) is mandatory.
88 Ohio St.3d 208, 2000-Ohio-302, 724 N.E.2d 793 pdf html	State v. Arnett	3/15/2000	Criminal law - When sentencing judge acknowledges consulting a religious text during deliberations and quotes a portion of that text on the record; such conduct is not per se impermissible and does not violate the offender's right to due process; when.


140 Ohio App.3d 433, 747 N.E.2d 900	State v. Griffin		(1) Court summarily rejects claims that Ohio's sexual predator statute violates the concept of separation of powers because it forces a trial court to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate individuals as sexual predators, and that the classification scheme is systematically flawed, thus violating due process. (2) Cruelty during an extended period of restraint, ended by the victim's escape, and lack of remorse warranted classification as a sexual predator. That the victim wrote to the defendant in prison is viewed as her own foolishness, and was not relevant at the classification hearing.
139 Ohio App.3d 827, 745 N.E.2d 1111	State v Boshko	09/25/2000		12th App, Clermont
139 Ohio App.3d 753, 745 N.E.2d 1055	State v. Tasseff	04/28/2000	A sexual-predator classification may not be predicated solely on the stale conviction for the underlying offense.	1st App, Hamilton
138 Ohio App.3d 861, 742 N.E.2d 716 html	State v Wilkerson	08/25/2000	Defendant was erroneously classified an habitual sex offender where there was not proof of a prior conviction under one of the qualifying subsections of the pandering obscenity statute.
138 Ohio App.3d 547, 741 N.E.2d 927	State v Austin	08/02/2000	Testimony concerning a 13-year old allegation of sexual abuse was improperly admitted. Information came from Children Services records. No charges had been brought and the witness had no personal knowledge of that investigation.
138 Ohio App.3d 522, 471 N.E.2d 910 htnl	State v Hall	06/23/2000
138 Ohio App.3d 171, 740 N.E.2d 727	State v Zapan
137 Ohio App.3d 260, 2000-Ohio-1685, 738 N.E.2d 456, pdf html	State v. Dick	3/31/2000
137 Ohio App.3d 130, 2000-Ohio-1669, 738 N.E.2d 90 pdf html	State v. Moyers	3/27/2000

Cite	Name	Date	Issue / Summary / As cited	Court	ORC, Const Amd.


86 Ohio 1999-Ohio-146, 86 Ohio St.3d 160, 712 N.E.2d 736 pdf html	State v. Brewer	7/28/1999	Criminal procedure — Classification as sexual predator — Sexual predator hearing conducted pursuant to R.C. 2950.09(C)(2) must take place prior to offender’s release from confinement — Hearing must be scheduled far enough in advance of offender’s release date to allow officials to satisfy statutory notification duties under R.C. 2950.03(A)(1).	Ohio St
86 Ohio St.3d 208, 1999-Ohio-95, 714 N.E.2d 381 pdf html	State v. Bellman	8/25/1999	Criminal procedure - Classification as a sexual predator - Defendant may waive R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) requirement that a sexual predator hearing precede sentencing - Defendant cannot be required to register as a sexual predator under R.C. 2950.04	Ohio St
87 Ohio St.3d 159, 1999-Ohio-315, 718 N.E.2d 428, pdf html	State ex rel. Miller v. Reed	11/10/1999	Prohibition — Writ sought to prohibit common pleas court judge and county prosecuting attorney from conducting a sexual predator classification hearing	Ohio St, 3rd App, Allen
87 Ohio St.3d 230, 1999-Ohio-27, 718 N.E.2d 1285, pdf html	State ex rel. Bruggeman v. Ingraham	11/24/1999	Prohibition — Writ sought to prohibit common pleas court judge and county prosecuting attorney from proceeding with a sexual predator classification hearing	Ohio St, 00 App, Auglaize


140 Ohio App.36 638, 749 N.E.2d 1144	State v Thompson	04/01/1999	Trial judge's statement he would never forget the facts of the case was inadequate for purposes of the statutory scheme and for purposes of appellate review	8th App, Cuyahoga
135 Ohio App.3d 759, 1999-Ohio-928, 735 N.E.2d 909 pdf html	State v. Anderson	11/9/1999		3rd App, Auglaize
134 Ohio App.3d 660, 731 N.E.2d 1200 html	State v Parker	09/09/1999
134 Ohio App.3d 45, 730 N.E.2d 388 html	State v West	06/11/1999
133 Ohio App.3d 459, 728 N.E.2d 454 html	State v Ake	09/15/1999
133 Ohio App.3d 90, 1999-Ohio-836, 726 N.E.2d 1076 pdf html	State v. Overcash	8/3/1999	Procedure - Sexual offender hearing.	3rd App, Shelby
132 Ohio App.3d 820, 726 N.E.2d 574 html	State V Maynard	03/01/1999		9th App, Lorain
132 Ohio App.3d 303, 724 N.E.2d 1217 html	IN RE Nicholson	02/16/1999
132 Ohio App.3d 252, 724 N.E.2d 1182	State v Netherland		finding waiver of right to hearing.
130 Ohio App.3d 551	State v Ward	02/08/1999		8th App, Cuyahoga

Cite	Name	Date	Issue / Summary / As cited	Court	ORC, Const Amd.


83 Ohio St.3d 404, 1998-Ohio-291, 700 N.E.2d 570, pdf html	State v. Cook	9/30/1998	Criminal procedure - Classification as a sexual predator - R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) as applied to conduct prior to the effective date of the statute, does not violate the Retroactivity Clause of * * * the Ohio Constitution or the Ex Post Facto Clause * * *.	Ohio St.	2950.09(B)(1), Retroactivity Clause - Sect 28, Art II Oh Cons, Ex Post Facto Clause - Sect 10, Art I - US Const



126 Ohio App.3d 36, 709 N.E.2d 875, html	State v. Avery	4/14/1998	Even if the terms of R.C. 2950.09 are worded broadly, a certain level of broadness in the language of R.C. Chapter 2950 allows for individualized assessment rather than an across-the-board rule. "Because each sexual-predator determination is fact-specific, the framework provided to the courts in the statute must be broadly worded to accommodate both the most common and most exceptional cases." State v. Avery (1998), 126 Ohio App.3d 36, 54, 709 N.E.2d 875, 887	3rd App, Union
128 Ohio App.3d 647, 716 N.E.2d 279, html	State v. Hicks	6/26/1998	The declaration of an offender’s status as a sexual predator cannot be automatic. See State v. Hicks (1998), 128 Ohio App.3d 647, 716 N.E.2d 279; State v. Lee (1998), supra; State v. Hunter, supra. The legislature did not contemplate that sexually-oriented offenders would be found to be sexual predators solely because they had been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a sexually-oriented offense. Id. The trial court must avoid indulging in the presumption that anyone with a prior sexually-oriented offense is a sexual predator. Id.	1st App, Hamilton
128 Ohio App.3d 710, 716 N.E.2d 751, html	State v Lee	6/28/1998	Both R.C. 2950.09(B) and (C) require a classification hearing before an Ohio offender is labeled as a sexual predator. Ohio courts, including this court, have held that R.C. 2950.09(B) and (C) fully comport with procedural due process because both sections give effect to an offender’s right to a hearing with notice and an opportunity to be heard.	1st App, Hamilton
129 Ohio App.3d 165, 717 N.E.2d 402, html	State v. Maye		"Although the standard set forth in R.C. 2950.01(E) looks toward the defendant's propensity to engage in sexually oriented behavior in the future, a trier of fact may look at past behavior as well since past behavior is often an important indicator of future propensity." State v. Maye (1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 165, 173.
130 Ohio App.3d 463, 720 N.E.2d 222, html	State v. McIntire	12/16/1998	Where an individual is sentenced by two different courts for sexually oriented offenses committed by the offender in two different counties, R.C. 2950.09 lodges jurisdiction to hold the sexual offender hearing in any court that has sentenced the offender for a sexually oriented offense. State v. McIntire (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 463, 465;
130 Ohio App.3d 467, 720 N.E.2d 545	State v Coffman	11/06/1998
130 Ohio App.3d 551, 720 N.E.2d 603, html	State v. Ward	12/08/1998	The defendants argue that R.C. Chapter 2950 denies equal protection of the laws because the statute applies to those sex offenders who are currently imprisoned, and not to those sex offenders who were released from prison prior to the statute's enactment date. The General Assembly could have rationally concluded, for example, that the burdens associated with locating sex offenders would have created an administrative and fiscal challenge that would have rendered the statute practically inoperative. See State v. Ward (1999), 130 Ohio App.3d 551, 566, 720 N.E.2d 603, 614. Regardless of the potential reasons for the enactment of the statute, however, the defendants have failed to present any arguments that negate the reasons that produced R.C. Chapter 2950. Accordingly, an equal protection challenge cannot be upheld. Heller, 509 U.S. at 320, 113 S.Ct. at 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d at 271.
131 Ohio App.3d 538, 723 N.E.2d 124, html	State v Sturgen	11/13/1998	Contends that R.C. 2950.09 does not give the trial court authority to adjudicate appellant as a sexually oriented offender, and because the trial court exceeded its authority in adjudicating appellant as such, appellant was prejudiced. "While it is true that a literal reading of R.C. 2950.09(C) limits the trial court in a sexual-predator hearing to a determination of whether or not the defendant is a sexual predator * * * other classifications may apply by operation of law to trigger registration and/or community-notification provisions." State v. Sturgeon (1998), 131 Ohio App. 3d 538, 540, 723 N.E.2d 124.
131 Ohio App.3d 587, 723 N.E.2d 158, pdf html	State v White	12/03/1998	R.C. 2950.09(C) is not impermissibly vague and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, the prohibition against retroactive laws in the Ohio Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, and the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions.


132 Ohio App.3d 41, 724 N.E.2d 458	Cent. Ohio Transit Auth. v. Timson	1998		10 App, Franklin

Cite	Name	Date	Issue / Summary / As cited	Court	ORC, Const Amd.


1994-Ohio-38	Sorrell v. Thevenir	06/01/1994	Torts - Damages - Collateral benefits - R.C. 2317.45 violates Sections 2, 5 and 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and is unconstitutional in toto.		Sect 2, 5 and 16, Art I - Ohio Const
61 Ohio St.3d 684, 576 N.E.2d 765	Moris v Savoy	08/27/1991	"Misguided laws may nonetheless be constitutional" James v Strange (1972), 407 U.S. 128,133, 92 SCt. 2027,3031, 32 L.Ed.2d 600,606.	Ohio St
37 Ohio St.3d 279, 525 N.E.2d 805	State Ex Rel. matz v Brown	07/06/1988	"Felons have no reasonable right to expect that their conduct will never thereafter be made subject of legislation"	Ohio St
11 Ohio St.3d 147, 464 N.E.2d 530	In re Burton	06/20/1984		Ohio St
14 Ohio App.3d 207, 470 N.E.2d 934	City of Cleveland v Huff	03/16/1984	If the statutes prohibit identical activity, require identical proof, and yet impose different penalties, the sentencing a person under the statute with the higher penalty violates the Equal Protection Clause	8th App, Cuyahoga
58 Ohio St.2d 52, 12 O.O.3d 51, 388 N.E.2d 745 html	State v Wilson	04/25/1979	"Therefore, if the statutes prohibit identical activity, require identical proof, and yet impose different penalties, the sentencing a person under the statute with the higher penalty violates the Equal Protection Clause"	Ohio St
43 Ohio St.2d 195, 72 O.O.2d 112, 331 N.E.2d 723 html	Primes v Tyler	07/23/1975	remedy, due course of the law	Ohio St	Ohio Const Sect 16 Art 1
44 Ohio App. 2d 82, 335 NE 2d 734 html	Brown v Best	11/25/1974	access to courts, A litigant has a constitutional guarantee of access to the courts and to deny him the opportunity to pursue his course to its end when he stands ready to do so deprives that litigant of that fundamental right.		Ohio Const Sect 16 Art 1
38 Ohio St .2d 35, 67 O.O.2d 53, 309 N.E.2d 907 html	Burton v Reshetylo	04/17/1974	The respondent in a habeas action retains the right to appeal the granting of a writ, event though the petitioner is no longer in his custody. The Court recognized that due process requires that the duration of commitment must bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose behind it.