Ohio Sexual Offender Registration Law Library

A library dedicated solely to sexual offender registration law and the State of Ohio. Possibility the only one in existence. Presently it contains over 1500 opinions including many supporting opinions. Keep in mind to fully research an issue. Specifically if you find an opinion that favors or rejects an argument your making. That opinion may have been reversed or affirmed by an higher court or another opinion. Also there are many supporting opinions that are cited that you should familiarize yourself with. Those in time will be added also. With that said do not count on this in any way as your sole source of information. It is intended to be a very good starting point and tool to understand the history of how we have gotten to the point we are at within the courts. If you have or know of any material not shown here that would be support this library please email us. Any opinions, law reviews and others sources are welcome.

Cite	Name	Date	Issue / Summary / As cited	Court	ORC, Const Amd.


2010-Ohio-5756	State v. Stansell	11/24/2010	The indictment charging the defendant with Failure to Notify under R.C. 2905.05 is not defective because it fails to specify culpability or a mens rea requirement of recklessness. R.C. 2950.05 imposes strict liability, and a mens rea element is not required. The defendant also waived any error regarding the use of a visiting judge, because he failed to object to the assignment during the trial court proceedings. Affirmed.	Montgomery
2010-Ohio-5386	State v. Hudson	11/5/2010	The trial court properly conducted a de novo sentencing hearing to correct Appellant’s void sentence that omitted notice of post-release control. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to designate Appellant a Tier III sex offender at resentencing, and that designation is vacated. Appellant’s original designation of sexually oriented offender is reinstated. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.	Montgomery
2010-Ohio-5004	State v. Jones	10/14/2010	defendant reclassified under, and indicted for violation of, portions of Adam Walsh Act now declared unconstitutional in State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424.	Cuyahoga
2010-Ohio-4923	State v. Owens	10/8/2010	Pursuant to Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, ¶ 66, Senate Bill 10 violates the separation of powers doctrine, and is therefore, unconstitutional. Thus, appellant’s reclassification as a Tier III sex offender is void. Appellant’s conviction for failure to verify his address every 90 days pursuant to the unconstitutional portions of S.B. 10 is reversed and vacated. Pursuant to Bodyke, appellant’s original classification as a sexually oriented offender is reinstated. Judgment reversed.	Montgomery
2010-Ohio-4755	State v. Huffman	10/1/2010	Holding in State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424., that sexual offender reclassification provisions of R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 violate the doctrine of separation of powers has no application to this defendant’s conviction for failure to comply with notification requirements. Defendant failed to comply with either the notification requirements of the prior law, which became applicable to him when his prior classification was reinstated under the State v. Bodyke holding, or the notification requirements of the new law. Defendant’s constitutional arguments have all been previously rejected by this court, and trial counsel was not ineffective for having failed to assert the separation of powers issue, which is not an impediment to defendant’s conviction of failing to comply with notification requirements. Defendant’s constitutional attack upon reporting and registration requirements are barred by res judicata, since it could have been asserted in an appeal from defendant’s original classification as a sexually oriented offender, which is reinstated by virtue of State v. Bodyke, supra. Affirmed.	Montgomery
2010-Ohio-4432	State v. Roby	9/17/2010	MISCELLANEOUS - Adam Walsh Act; separation of powers; R.C. 2950.031; R.C. 2950.032; previous adjudication.	Trumbull
2010-Ohio-4371	Green v. State	9/17/2010	SEX OFFENSES: The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424., does not apply to cases in which there is no prior court order classifying an offender under a sex-offender category: where there is no prior judicial order classifying a sex offender, reclassification by the attorney general under Senate Bill 10 does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine under Bodyke, because it does not require the opening of a final court order or a review by the executive branch of a past decision of the judicial branch. In cases where there has been no prior judicial adjudication of the offender under a sex-offender category, the holding in Sewell v. State, 181 Ohio App.3d 280, 2009-Ohio-872, 908 N.E.2d 995, is still applicable.	Hamilton
2010-Ohio-4375	State v. Jackson	9/16/2010	Under State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424., defendant may not be reclassified under Ohio's Adam Walsh Act. The state's cross-appeal dismissed on the authority of Chojnacki v. Cordray, 126 Ohio St.3d 321, 2010-Ohio-3212.	Franklin
2010-Ohio-4374	State v. Houston	9/16/2010	Pursuant to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424., R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032, provisions concerning sexual offender reclassification, are unconstitutional and may not be enforced. Therefore, the defendant could not be reclassified under these provisions, and the judgment of the trial court was reversed.	Franklin
2010-Ohio-4274	State v. Bowlin	9/10/2010	The registration requirements of S.B. 10 were applied prospectively to the defendant and are not violative of the ex post facto provisions of the United States and Ohio Constitutions, nor do they offend the retro-activity prohibitions of the Ohio Constitution. The residency restrictions of S.B. 10 are also constitutional. Judgment affirmed.	Montgomery
2010-Ohio-4187	State v. Watkins	9/7/2010	Under State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424., defendant may not be reclassified under Ohio's Adam Walsh Act. The state's cross-appeal dismissed on the authority of Chojnacki v. Cordray, 126 Ohio St.3d 321, 2010-Ohio-3212.	Franklin
2010-Ohio-4127	State v. Harris	9/2/2010	Defendant's last-minute request, in the middle of his criminal sentencing hearing, to "fire" his attorney, when unaccompanied by any specific reasons for so doing, is too general to require further inquiry from the trial court, much less grant defendant's request to discharge his counsel.	Franklin
2010-Ohio-3772	State v. Kelch	8/13/2010	Pursuant to Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424., ¶ 66, Senate Bill 10 violates the separation of powers doctrine, and is, therefore, unconstitutional. Thus, appellant’s reclassification as a Tier II sex offender is hereby reversed, and the trial court is ordered to reinstate appellant’s original offender designation. Judgment reversed.	Montgomery
2010-Ohio-3748	Franklin Cty. Prosecuting Attorney O'Brien v. Smith	8/12/2010	The trial court did not retroactively apply the residency restrictions of R.C. 2950.034 to defendant who was a sexually oriented offender as a result of a 2006 conviction where (1) R.C. 2950.031 was effective at the time of defendant's offense and prohibited a sexually oriented offender from living within 1,000 feet of a school, and (2) R.C. 2950.034, effective after defendant's offense, broadened the prohibition to include preschools and daycare centers, neither of which formed a part of the allegations against defendant.	Franklin
2010-Ohio-3715	State v. Patterson	8/12/2010	SEXUALLY ORIENTED OFFENDER; ADAM WALSH ACT; SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE; RECLASSIFICATION	Cuyahoga
2010-Ohio-360	State v. Leonard	8/5/2010	Constitutional Law, ineffective assistance of counsel; Evidence, sufficiency, weight; Failure to Notify of Change of Address; Sexual Offender	Cuyahoga
188 Ohio App.3d 498, 2010-Ohio-3507, pdf	Keeney v. State	7/30/2010	SEX OFFENSES: Where the record does not reflect that the petitioner has been convicted of a sexually oriented offense, viz., there has never been a judicial determination that his offense of felonious assault was committed with the purpose of gratifying his sexual needs or desires, he is not required to register as a sex offender under R.C. Chapter 2950.	Hamilton
2010-Ohio-3447	State v. Gibson	7/23/2010	Trial court properly concluded that defendant’s sexual offender classification would not be affected by the validity of his sentence for underlying convictions and was not void. Judgment affirmed.	Champaign
2010-Ohio-3443	Cassell v. Nasal	7/23/2010	Per State v. Bodyke, the trial court erred when it denied Plaintiffs’ petition for a declaration that R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 are unconstitutional; judgment reversed.	Miami
2010-Ohio-3407	State v. Carlisle	7/22/2010	Modification of sentence; final judgment; law of the case; mandate rule; community control; medical release	Cuyahoga
2010-Ohio-3452	State v. Scott	7/20/2010	Since appellant was classified as a Tier II sexual offender by the trial court, State v. Bodyke, Ohio St.3d , 2010-Ohio-2424 has no application to him. His challenges to the constitutionality of S.B. 10 are without merit. Judgment Affirmed.	Montgomery
2010-Ohio-3448	State v. Green	7/19/2010	Because Defendant’s reclassification as a Tier II sex offender is unconstitutional, per State v. Bodyke, his failure to comply with the registration and notification requirements resulting from his reclassification is not criminal conduct for which Defendant may be found guilty. Convictions reversed and Defendant discharged.	Montgomery
2010-Ohio-3341,	Dayton v. Flinn	7/16/2010	The Dayton Municipal Court convicted Appellant of failure to comply with an order issued under section 93.05 of the City of Dayton’s Housing Ordinance. To challenge an order’s validity one must follow the path of administrative appeal. Appellant contends also that this is not a strict-liability offense. Amendments to the Housing Ordinance make the city’s purpose to impose strict liability plain. Judgment affirmed.	2nd App, Montgomery
126 Ohio St.3d 321, 2010-Ohio-3212, pdf	Chojnacki v. Cordray	7/13/2010	Causes dismissed as moot.	12 App, Warren
188 Ohio App.3d 232, 2010-Ohio-3247, pdf	State v. Powell	7/9/2010	A manifest injustice is shown and the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s petition to vacate his guilty plea. Appellant’s plea is vacated and the matter is remanded.	Greene
2010-Ohio-3246, pdf	State v. Kropff	7/9/2010	Trial court erred, per State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424., when it denied Defendant’s challenge to his reclassification as a Tier II sex offender. Reversed	2nd App, Montgomery
2010-Ohio-3240, pdf	State v. Dudley	7/9/2010	Assuming that trial counsel should have filed a motion to suppress the defendant’s statements to police, the defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to file a motion, because the statements would have been admissible on rebuttal to impeach the defendant’s claim that the victim consented to sexual contact and conduct. Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance in failing to object to separate sentences imposed for rape and kidnapping. Although these crimes are allied offenses of similar import, they were committed with a separate animus. Trial counsel should have objected to the imposition of separate sentences for gross sexual imposition and two counts of attempted rape, since these crimes are allied offenses with rape, and were not committed with a separate animus. Reversed and Remanded solely for a new sentencing hearing, at which the State may elect the allied offense on which it wishes to proceed.	2nd App, Montgomery
2010-Ohio-3141, pdf	Rutan v. State	7/6/2010	Sex offender reclassification; Adam Walsh Act; Trial court erred in its decision overruling appellant's petition challenging his sex offender reclassification for his classification was unconstitutional pursuant to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424.	12th App, Madison
2010-Ohio-3134,	Boswell v. State	7/6/2010	The provisions of Ohio's Adam Walsh Act governing the reclassification of sex offenders that were already classified by a judge under former R.C. Chapter 2950 (Megan's Law) and that were subsequently reclassified under Ohio's Adam Walsh Act, violate the doctrine of sState v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424.	12 App, Warren
2010-Ohio-3082,	Means v. State	7/1/2010	The Adam Walsh Act; separation of powers; State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424.; reclassification.	8th App, Cuyahoga
2010-Ohio-3079,	State v. Kopchock	7/1/2010	R.C. 2941.32; double jeopardy; R.C. 2907.04(A); R.C. 2901.22(C); reckless	8th App, Cuyahoga
2010-Ohio-3015, pdf	State v. Gordon	6/30/2010	Judgment of trial court denying defendant's petition to contest reclassification under Senate Bill No. 10 reversed on the basis of State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424.	10th App, Franklin
2010-Ohio-2992, pdf	State v. Culgan	6/30/2010	subject matter jurisdiction – State v. Foster – sexual predator classification – ineffective assistance of counsel – unreasonable delay – Crim.R. 32(A) –	9th App, Medina
2010-Ohio-2972, pdf	State v. Heath	6/29/2010	Judgment of trial court denying defendant's petition to contest reclassification under Senate Bill No. 10 reversed on the basis of State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424.	10th App, Franklin
2010-Ohio-2986, pdf	In re R.D.	6/28/2010	Juvenile Tier classification	5th App, Licking
2010-Ohio-2887,	Dudowski v. State	6/24/2010	R.C. 2950.031; R.C. 29590.032; ADAM WALSH ACT Judgment reversed on the basis of State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424..	8th App, Cuyahoga
2010-Ohio-2880	State v. Smith	6/24/2010	Adam Walsh Act, unconstitutional provisions; Failure to verify address; Reclassification by attorney general. Judgment reversed on the basis of State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424.	8th App, Cuyahoga
2010-Ohio-2842, pdf	State v. Robins	6/18/2010	The trial court’s determination that S.B. 10 does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine is error. Appellant’s remaining arguments lack merit. Judgment reversed on the basis of State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424.	2nd App, Montgomery
2010-Ohio-2834, pdf	State v. Hill	6/18/2010	The judgment of the trial court that S.B. 10 does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine is reversed on the basis of State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424.	2nd App, Montgomery
2010-Ohio-2775, pdf	State v. Bernthold	6/17/2010	Judgment of trial court denying defendant's petition to contest reclassification under Senate Bill No. 10 reversed on the basis of State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424.	10th App, Franklin
2010-Ohio-2772, pdf	State v. Toles	6/17/2010	Judgment of trial court denying defendant's petition to contest reclassification under Senate Bill No. 10 reversed on the basis of State v. Bodyke,126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424.	10th App, Franklin
2010-Ohio-2700, pdf	In re J.M.	6/14/2010	Juvenile offender registrant; Juvenile under the age of fourteen at the time of the commission of offense cannot be classified as a juvenile offender registrant; R.C. 2950.01(M); R.C. 2152.82(A)(2); R.C. 2152.83(A)(1)(b) and (B)(1)(b); R.C. 2152.86(A)(1), (A)(2)(b), and (A)(3)(b); Record does not establish J.M.’s age at the time of the offense; Classification for fourteen year old is discretionary; R.C. 2152.83(B)(2)(a) and (b); Record does not disclose whether trial court or defense counsel were aware that classification was discretionary for fourteen year old; Ineffective assistance of counsel argument moot; Constitutional issue not raised to the trial court; We will not exercise discretion to address constitutional issue in this instance.	7th App, Jefferson
2010-Ohio-2759, pdf	State v. Wood	6/14/2010	AWA Classification; Hearing Tier III classification, but no sexual offense was committed. Convicted of kidnapping 2905.01(B). No sexual motivation. Also see 2010-Ohio-884	5th App, Stark
2010-Ohio-2486, pdf	In re D.L.W.	6/3/2010	ADAM WALSH ACT – TIMELINESS OF DELINQUENT CHILD’S PETITION FOR HEARING CHALLENGING RECLASSIFICATION.	8th App, Cuyahoga
126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, pdf	State v. Bodyke	6/3/2010	Criminal law — R.C. Chapter 2950 — Sex offenders — R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 violate separation of powers by requiring executive branch to reclassify sex offenders already classified by court order — Only appellate courts are constitutionally permitted to review or modify court judgments — Executive branch may not reopen final judgments — Stare decisis — Doctrine not controlling in cases presenting constitutional question — R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 severed. From 2008-Ohio-6387	Ohio St - Huron
2010-Ohio-2435, pdf	State v. Meade	6/1/2010	Criminal Law – Adam Walsh Act – Sex offender classification – Exemption – R.C. 2950.01 – "Sexually oriented offense" – "Sex offender" – Misdemeanor – R.C. 2907.04 – Unlawful sexual conduct with a minor – An offender who is convicted of misdemeanor unlawful sexual conduct with a minor may be exempt from sex offender registration requirements where, inter alia, there is evidence that the victim consented to the sexual conduct. Because the record in this case is devoid of any facts pertaining to the victim's consent (or lack thereof), the matter must be remanded for a hearing to address this issue.	12th App, Brown
2010-Ohio-2421, pdf	State v. Palmer	6/1/2010	The provisions of R.C. 2950.04(A)(2) apply regardless of when the sexually oriented offense was committed and are not limited by when a defendant was sentenced for the sexually oriented offense or released from incarceration for the sexually oriented offense.	10th App, Franklin
2010-Ohio-2364, pdf	State v. Lukacs	5/28/2010	APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – EVIDENCE/WITNESS/TRIAL – INDICTMENT/COMPLAINT – PROSECUTOR – RAPE – SEX OFFENSES: The defendant’s conviction for failure to verify his address under R.C. 2950.06(B)(2) was supported by sufficient evidence when a police officer testified that he had calculated the defendant’s date to verify by using 180-day periods from the date the defendant had originally registered as a sexually oriented offender under the previous law and the defendant had failed to appear at the sheriff’s office by that date. The defendant’s prospective classification as a Tier III offender under Senate Bill 10, which implemented the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. The defendant failed to demonstrate that a reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the trial would have been different absent any alleged errors, and, therefore, he has failed to show that the cumulative effect of any errors denied him a fair trial. The case must be remanded because the trial court failed to address the mandatory issue of court costs at the sentencing hearing or in its judgment entry.	1st App, Hamilton
188 Ohio App.3d 318, 2010-Ohio-2295. pdf	In re G.M.	5/24/2010	Juvenile court was without jurisdiction to issue an order classifying a delinquent child as a juvenile sex offender after he turned 21.	3rd App, Defiance
2010-Ohio-2265, pdf	Garrity v. State	5/21/2010	After finding that the new registration requirements of R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 applicable to reclassified tier III sex offenders do not apply to Defendant, the trial court erred in dismissing the petition Defendant filed, challenging his tier III reclassification, for lack of jurisdiction. Reversed and remanded.	2nd App, Montgomery
2010-Ohio-2214, pdf	State v. Johnson	5/20/2010	Aggravated burglary; rape; consecutive sentences; life tail; presumption of concurrent sentences; elevated sentence; R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b); R.C. 2907.02(B); expressio unius est exclusio alterius; sexually violent predator specification; R.C. 2971.03; R.C. 2941.148; R.C. 2929.11(B); R.C. 2929.14(A)(1); abuse of discretion; cruel and unusual punishment; Solem analysis; Adam Walsh Act; R.C. 2929.19(B)(4)(a); due process violation; equal protection violation; fundamental right; residency restriction; actual injury; standing	8th App, Cuyahoga
125 Ohio St.3d 450, 2010-Ohio-2123, pdf	State v. Clayborn	5/20/2010	Criminal appeals — App.R. 4(A) — An appeal from an R.C. Chapter 2950 sexual-offender classification is an appeal in a criminal case that must be filed pursuant to App.R. 4(A) within 30 days after judgment is entered — Judgment affirmed.	Ohio St - 10th App, Franklin
* 2010-Ohio-2005	State v. Frederick	5/7/2010	Trial court did not err by overruling appellant's constitutional challenges to S.B. 10. The retroactive application of S.B. 10 does not violate the constitutions of the United States and Ohio because its provisions are civil and remedial in nature according to Montgomery v. Leffler, 6th Dist. No. H-08-011, 2008-Ohio-6397.	6th App, Lucas
2010-Ohio-1977, pdf	State v. Bias	5/6/2010	Plea; allied offenses; sexual battery; abduction; Adam Walsh Act; prospective application of the AWA; R.C. 2907.03; R.C. 2905.02.	8th App, Cuyahoga
2010-Ohio-1946, pdf	Acheson v. State	5/3/2010	Constitutional Law – Ohio's Adam Walsh Act – Sex Offender Reclassification – Community Notification – R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) – R.C. 2950.11(H)(1) – This court has already stricken the constitutional challenges raised by appellant against Ohio's Adam Walsh Act. However, the trial court should have considered appellant's community notification claim. Appellant, a sex offender who became subject to community notification only after he was reclassified under the Adam Walsh Act, properly filed for removal of this sanction in the common pleas court of the county in which he was currently incarcerated.	12 App, Warren
2010-Ohio-1088, pdf	In re Messmer	3/22/2010	On appeal, Messmer argues that the trial court abused its discretion in classifying him as a Tier II sex offender based on a finding that the classification was mandated by his offense; that the application of Senate Bill 10 (“S.B. 10”) to his case resulted in a violation of his due process rights and right to equal protection under the United States and Ohio Constitutions; and, that S.B. 10’s application violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution and the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution. Based on the following, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.	3rd App, Wyandot
2010-Ohio-1126, pdf	State v. Hunt	3/19/2010	Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s petition to contest his sex offender reclassification under Senate Bill 10. Senate Bill 10 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, and retroactive application of Senate Bill 10 is not contrary to the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Retroactivity Clause, the Double Jeopardy Clause, or substantive due process. The application of Senate Bill 10 to defendant does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Judgment affirmed.	2nd App, Montgomery
2010-Ohio-1123, pdf	State v. Haines	3/19/2010	Assuming, for the sake of argument, that certain portions of Ohio's sex offender laws were repealed between July 2007 and January 1, 2008, when they were re-enacted as amended, petitioner has no claim for relief, since he became subject to the provisions of Senate Bill 10, effective January 1, 2008. Senate Bill 10 also does not violate prohibitions against retroactive laws, the separation of powers doctrine, the Double Jeopardy Clause, and substantive and procedural due process protections. Finally, sexual offender reclassification under Senate Bill 10 is not an impermissible impairment of contractual obligations. Affirmed.	2nd App, Montgomery
124 Ohio St.3d 556, 2010-Ohio-958, pdf html	State v. McConville	3/18/2010	Criminal law — Sexual-offender registration — R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) — Suspension of community-notification requirements — Effective date. From 182 Ohio App.3d 99, 2009-Ohio-1713.	Ohio St - 00 App, Lorain	R.C. 2950.11(F)(2)
2010-Ohio-1005, pdf	State v. Heverly	3/15/2010	Plea agreement; Crim.R. 11; “[T]hat a trial court need not inform a sex offender of the registration and notification requirements of R.C. Chapter 2950 before accepting a plea. We have described the registration and notification requirements as collateral consequences of a defendant's guilty plea to a sex offense. Therefore, a trial court is not obligated to inform a defendant about these requirements before accepting his plea, and its failure to do so does not render the plea invalid.	7th App, Columbiana
2010-Ohio-993, pdf	State v. Sabol	3/12/2010	The trial court erred in dismissing indictments for failure to notify and failure to verify address on the ground that R.C. Chapter 2950, as amended by Senate Bill 10, is unconstitutional. Senate Bill 10 did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause, Retroactivity Clause, Double Jeopardy Clause, and procedural and substantive due process. Judgments reversed and cases remanded for further proceedings.	2nd App, Montgomery
2010-Ohio-884, pdf	State v. Wood	3/8/2010	Tier III classification, but no sexual offense was committed. Convicted of kidnapping 2905.01(B). No sexual motivation. Also see 2010-Ohio-2759	5th App, Stark
2010-Ohio-767, pdf	Nixon v. State	3/5/2010	SEX OFFENSES – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CIVIL: The retroactive application of Senate Bill 10’s tier-classification and registration requirements to a sex offender who had pleaded guilty to a sexually-oriented offense pursuant to a plea bargain under former R.C. Chapter 2950 did not violate the Contract Clause of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. See Burbrink v. State, 1st Dist. No. C-081075, 2009-Ohio-5346; White v. State, 1st Dist. No. C-090177, 2010-Ohio 234. Senate Bill 10’s tier-classification and registration requirements are remedial, collateral consequences of the underlying criminal sex offense, and they do not affect a plea agreement previously entered between the state and the offender. [SEE CONCURRENCE IN JUDGMENT ONLY: The retroactive application of Senate Bill 10 may give rise to a violation of the Contract Clause in a case where the offender’s plea agreement includes terms governing his sexual-offender classification and registration obligations; but where the record does not contain sufficient evidence of such terms in the plea agreement, there is no constitutional violation under the Contract Clause.]	1st App, Hamilton
2010-Ohio-749, pdf	State v. Zerla	3/2/2010	State v. Byers, 7th Dist. No. 07 CO 39, 2008-Ohio-5051; State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570; separation of powers; retroactivity clause; due process; ex post facto laws; double jeopardy.	7th App, Jefferson
2010-Ohio-737, pdf	Boernke v. State	3/1/2010	The General Assembly's decision to categorize sex offenders based upon the crime committed rather than to require individual determinations of dangerousness bears a rational relationship with the statute's intended purpose. Sewell v. State, 181 Ohio App.3d 280, 2009-Ohio-872, at ¶22; King, at ¶ 23. Senate Bill 10 does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, or the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. State v. Williams, Warren App. No. CA2008-02-029, 2008-Ohio-6195. Senate Bill 10 does not violate the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution and the Contract Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. State v. Ritchie, Clermont App. No. CA2008-07-073, 2009-Ohio-1841.	12 App, Warren
2010-Ohio-736, pdf	Miller v. State	3/1/2010	The General Assembly's decision to categorize sex offenders based upon the crime committed rather than to require individual determinations of dangerousness bears a rational relationship with the statute's intended purpose. Sewell v. State, 181 Ohio App.3d 280, 2009-Ohio-872, at ¶22. Senate Bill 10 does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, or the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. State v. Williams, Warren App. No. CA2008-02-029, 2008-Ohio-6195. Senate Bill 10 does not violate the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution and the Contract Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. State v. Ritchie, Clermont App. No. CA2008-07-073, 2009-Ohio-1841.	12 App, Warren
2010-Ohio-669, pdf	Beck v. State	2/26/2010	SEX OFFENSES – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CIVIL: Senate Bill 10 was properly applied to reclassify the petitioner as a Tier III sex offender, when his prior status as a sexually oriented offender and his duty to register had arisen by operation of law upon his conviction for sexual battery and his release from prison for that offense after July 1, 1997; under former R.C. Chapter 2950, the petitioner had a duty to register as a sexually oriented offender for ten years, even though he had never registered, and there had never been a hearing or a court order to determine his status.	1st App, Hamilton
2010-Ohio-618, pdf	State ex rel. Waters v. Noble Cty. Common Pleas Court	2/22/2010	Petition for Writ of Procedendo; Procedendo appropriate when a court has either refused to render a judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment; Procedendo may lie if a judge erroneously stays a proceeding; State ex rel. Watkins v. Eighth Dist. Court of Appeals (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 532, 535; Stay in trial court granted on basis of John Doe I, et al. v. Marc Dann, et al., Case No. 1:8-CV-002200-PAG; John Doe has been resolved, thus no longer warranted; State v. Bodyke, 121 Ohio St.3d 1438, 2009-Ohio-1638, however, may impact this case; Procedendo lies because John Doe has been disposed of; however, trial court is within its authority to issue another stay on the basis of the Bodyke case currently pending before the Ohio Supreme Court.	7th App, Nobel
2010-Ohio-646, pdf	In re Rodney C.	2/19/2010	Senate Bill 10; juvenile sex offender	5th App, Licking
2010-Ohio-379, pdf	State v. Gillingham	2/5/2010	Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s petition to contest his sex offender reclassification under Senate Bill 10. Defendant’s constitutional challenges to Senate Bill 10 based on Ex Post Facto Clause, Retroactivity Clause, procedural due process, and double jeopardy were without merit. Defendant’s reclassification was not barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the separation of powers doctrine. Trial court was not required to hold a hearing prior to subjecting defendant to community notification under R.C. 2950.11; regardless, the exception set forth in R.C. 2950.11(F)(2) would not have applied to defendant because he was previously classified a sexual predator. Due to defendant’s prior classification as a sexual predator, Defendant was properly reclassified as a Tier III offender, even though his offenses are defined as Tier II offenses. Judgment affirmed.	2nd App, Montgomery
2010-Ohio-340, pdf	State v. Donofrio	2/1/2010	Adam Walsh	5th App, Stark
2010-Ohio-336, pdf	State v. Sturm	2/1/2010	AWA; breach of contract	5th App, Stark
2010-Ohio-279, pdf	State v. Dobson	1/29/2010	Trial court did not err in dismissing petition to contest sex offender reclassification under Senate Bill 10. Defendant’s constitutional challenges to Senate Bill 10 based on ex post facto clause, retroactivity clause, procedural due process, substantive due process, and double jeopardy were without merit. Judgment affirmed.	00 App, Miami
2010-Ohio-234, pdf	White v. State	1/29/2010	SEX OFFENSES – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CIVIL: The retroactive application of Senate Bill 10’s tier-classification and registration requirements to a sex offender who had pleaded guilty to a sexually-oriented offense pursuant to a plea bargain under former R.C. Chapter 2950 did not violate the Contract Clause of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. See Burbrink v. State, 1st Dist. No. C-081075, 2009-Ohio-5346. Senate Bill 10’s tier-classification and registration requirements are remedial, collateral consequences of the underlying criminal sex offense, and they do not affect a plea agreement previously entered between the state and the offender.	1st App, Hamilton
2010-Ohio-171, pdf	State v. Adams	1/21/2010	The common pleas court properly determined defendant is not subject to reclassification or duty to register as a "sex offender" under any tier of Ohio's current sex offender registration and notification laws as a result of his conviction of a misdemeanor violation of R.C. 2907.04 where (1) the plea did not involve the issue of consent and (2) the plea stipulated defendant was not more than four years older than the victim.	10th App, Franklin
2010-Ohio-140, pdf	State v. Rodgers	1/19/2010	Appeals the Stark County Court of Common Pleas ruling finding that the retroactive application of Senate Bill [“S.B.”] 10, Ohio's sexual offender classification and registration scheme, to him did not constitute a breach of his plea agreement.	5th App, Stark